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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARGARET CONOVER and
LORRAINE BEACH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEBO
SCHOOL DISTRICT, HAROL~D
CHRISTENS E N, LA VON
PAYNE, L. J· CRABB, WILLIAM F. BROADBENT·, DR.
JESSE ELLSWORTH, Board
Members, and B. L. ISAACS,
iClerk of said Board,
Defendants and
Respondents.

:Case
No. 8048

Brief of Appellants
This is primarily a case involving ques~tions of
law. The case was tried below upon the pleadings,
no direct evidence having been introduced by either
side (R. 23, lines 2-23, incl.). Let us therefore take
a look at the pleadings to determine the facts before
this Appellate Court·
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The defendants, hereinafter called respondents,
are residents and taxpayers of the N ebo School District, residing and owning property in Springville,
Utah (R. 10, R. 14).
The defendants, hereinafter calle·d respondents,
are the Board of Education of the Nebo School
District, the individual members thereof, and the
clerk of said school board (R. 10, R. 14).
On February 18, 1953, the Nebo School District
held a ~oard of Education meeting. (R· 10, R. 14).
The respondents admit each of the foregoing
statements so there is no issue of fact as to those
matters (R. 14).
The respondents admit that on February 19,
1953, appellants called in person at the office of
said Nebo School District in Spanish Fork, Utah,
and requested the opportunity to examine and copy
the minutes of the meeting held February 18, 1953
(R. 15).
Respondents further admit that appellants were
advised by the clerk's office that until the clerk's
tentative notes of the minutes had b·een first read
and approved at a subsequent meeting of the Board
that they were not available for inspection (R. 15).
Respondents admit th.at at the tim·e of appellants' requested opportunity to examine. and copy
said minutes that the clerk had then transcribed his
2
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tentative notes so as to present them to the Board
at the next succeeding· meeting· for Board approval
as official minutes (R. 15).
Appellants allege and defendents admit tha~t
immediately following some decisions at board
meetings and without awaiting approval of minutes
at subsequent meetings, action has been taken and
obligations have been incurred by the Board in
compliance with said de~isions reached at Board
meetings (R. 11, R. 15).
The respondents admit (R. 16) that refusal of
the clerk's office to permit the inspection of Board
minutes was based in part at least upon the following communication:
"DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
E· ALLEN BATEMAN, Superintendent
State Capitol
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
February 16, 1953
"Mr. B. L. Isaac
Clerk Board of Education
Nebo School District
Spanish Fork, Utah
Dear Mr. Isaac:
"In answ·er to your letter of February 13,
1953, I would give my opinion as follows:
"1. The minutes of a board of education
do not become official until they have been approved by the Board.
3
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2. It is the board's privilege to determine
wheth~er tentative copies of minutes shall be
sent to each board member immediately following the meeting or whether the clerk should not
distribute them until the next meeting of the
board of education when they could be read and
approved in the same meeting.
"3. The board of education should determin.e its own policy with reference to the release.
of ten•tative minutes to any other persons than
members of the board or whether a board
member should be permitted to give tentative
copies of minutes to any other person.
"In other words, I think all of the questions
raised in your letter are questions on policies
which your own board of education. should determine.
Sincerely yours,
E. Allen Bateman
State Superintendent of
Public Instruction"
EAB-ls
Respondents admit that appellants as taxpayers
and citizens are entitled to current and timely information with respect to the activities of their School
Board (R. 16).
In addition to the foregoing admissions by
respondents, they made certain allegations of their
own. However, all of these additional allegations
by respondents are denied by virtue o!Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (d).
4
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Thus for purposes of this appeal those matters
admitted by respondents are the only facts before
this court.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
THE FINDINGS OF FA·CT ARE NOT· SUPPORTED BY T'HE RECORD.
Finding of F'act No. 4 (R. 27) by the court
below, contains the following statem·ent, "but that
such decisions have been arrived at at such meetings
at which the plaintiffs have been at libe-rty to attend,
or concerning which they have been a•t liberty to
secure information from anybody in attendance,
the entries in the journal being merely evidence of
the official action." The quoted language is an allegation of respond·ents which is not admitted by appellants in the pleadings. Rule 8 (d) of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that such an allegation
shall be taken as denied or avoided. Thus, there is no
support whatever in the r-ecord for the foregoing
finding. The finding is irrelevant and immaterial to
the issue before the court anyway, and has no bearing whatsoever on the matter for consideration. In
Conover v. Board of Education, 110 Utah 454, 175 P
2nd 209, this same Board argu·ed that because a
taxpayer could easily obtain more detailed information if it was desired, by going to the district clerk
and ob•taining the records, that therefore the Board
did not need to publish the d·etailed information.
Now it would appear that the Board feels that
because a taxpayer could go to a board meeting and
5
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learn first hand what transpired, that it need not
make its records available to th~e public. This court
in the ·Conover case supra, held that it was not
impressed with such an .argument. Assuming that
appellants had the right to attend the Board meetings, this has nothing to do with their statutory
right to inspect and copy public writings.
The foregoing comments as to findings No. 4
are just as pertinent and applicable to finding No.
6. Finding No. 6 (R. 28) is as follows:
"6. That the m·eetings of the Board are
public and no attempt has been made by the
Board to restrict plaintiffs' attendance at
such meetings or to prevent them from obtaining information from anyone in attendance
thereat as to the happenings a~t the meeting,
but the Board claims the right to reserve their
tentative notes of proceedings until they have
been .approved by the Board and entered into
the journal, maintaining that until they have
been entered in th·e journal, they are not public
records."
Thus, this finding should be stricken from the
record.
Findings of Fact No. 7 and 8 (R. 28-30, incl.)
are as follows:
"7. Previous to the meeting in question,
release by the !Clerk of tentative notes of proceedings prior to their checking and approval
by the Board has involved inaccuracies in reporting the business transacted by said Board
and its proceedings and that because of such
6
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fact, the Board has adopted the procedure of
having tentative notes submitted to it for
checking and for approval before they are
accepted as minutes of meetings; that there
has been no effort made to suppress any information as to action or proceedings taken
by the Board, nor to prev·ent in any way the
attendance of the plaintiffs, or any interested
citizen, at Board meetings or to prevent the
plaintiffs or anyone else fro1n examining all
of its minutes and other official records at
the earliest practicable time; that all records,
including the journal, have been prop·erly
kept by the Clerk and they have always been
available for inspection to the plaintiffs .and
that the minutes of the parti~ular meeting
r~eferred to by plaintiffs within a reasonable
time after February 18th, 1953, were approved by the Board and entered in the journal and since then, at .all times, have been
available to the plain,tiffs and all other citizens
for inspection and copying; that the plaintiffs,
by reason of motives personal to then1selves,
have demanded the right to inspect and take
copies of tentative notes or transcriptions
thereof by the Clerk before such notes or
transcriptions have been approved by the
Board and entered in the official journal kept
by the Clerk under Section 56-6-15, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and have demanded that the
Clerk immediately transcribe the minutes of
meetings and make them immediately available to citizens, including plaintiffs, for their
inspection and copying; that the defendants
claim that the said tentative notes are not
public writings and that the plaintiffs cannot
dictate the m·ethod used by the Clerk and the
Board of Education in insuring the accuracy
of the official journal.
7
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"8. That at no time have the defendants or any of them withheld from th·e plaintiffs or refused to permit them to inspect or
to have full access to the official journal of
the said Board of Education, including all
official minutes or public writings concerning
the said meetings and that said journal as
kept by the Clerk of the Board has been, at
all times, and is available for the inspection
of ~ntiffs, or any of them, or any other
citizens. That the action of the Clerk of said
Board and that of said Board in not having
the said tentative notes entered in the journal
as official minutes of said meeting until approved by the Board to assure their accuracy
at the following meeting of the Board was,
and is, reasonable and that the demand of the
plaintiffs for a release of said tentative notes
as public writings the day following said
meeting was not reasonable or timely."
All of the statements in the foregoing findings
No. 7 and 8 are mere allegations of respondents, not
admitted by appellants. Since Rule 8 (d) Utah Rules
of ·Civil Procedure provides that such allegations
shall be taken as denied or avoided, there is no basis
in this re~ord for either of tpese findings of fact.
The same argument as to relevancy which is made
with respect to Finding No. 4 is equally applicable
and will not be restated here.
POINT II
THE TRANS·CRIBED TENTATIVE NOTES
OR MINUTES AR:E PUBLIC WRITING·S
The question befor·e this court is simply this:
Are the 'transcribed notes made by the clerk of the
8
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Board of Education official documents within the
meaning of Section 78-26-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, before being approved by the Board of
Education at a subsequent meeting?
Section 78-26-1 provides that public writings
are divided into four classes: Laws, judicial records,
other official documents and public records kept in
this State, of private writings. Of the four classifications, the one under which we contend the notes
of the school clerk fall is "official documents."
The word "documents" has been given the
following definition in 27 C. J. S·ec. at page 1311:
"Anything bearing a legible or significant inscription or legend, that which conveys
information; hence, a written or printed instrument; anything that may be read as
communicating an idea; some writing, like
a deed, a will, a letter, or an account rendered
or stated; any matter expressed or inscribed
upon any substance by means of letters,
figures, or marks, or by more than one of
these means, intended to be used or which
may be used for the purpose of recording
that matter.* * * The word is of very comprehensive signification, and applies to recorded
words whether written, printed, lithographed
or photographed, the thing on which the
words are recorded being immaterial."
"The clerk of each Board of Education
shall attend all meetings of the board, shall
keep an accurate journal of its proceedings,
and have the care and custody of the seal,
records and papers of such board * * *". 53-615, Utah 1Code Annotated 1953.
·9
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Under the section of the Utah Code just quoted
the clerk of the school board is the one. who is required to keep the accurate journal of the Board's
proceedings. It is the statutory duty of th·e clerk- ·
n·ot thie Board-.to keep the journal. His entries and
notes made at the time of the meeting are official
documents, admissible as evidence in court.
As .authority for this statement Utah Code
Annotated 1953, Section 78-25-4 provides:
"An entry made by an officer or board of
officers, or under the direction or in the presence of either, in the course of official duty,
is prima facie evidence of the fact stated in
such entry."
Section 78-25-3 reads:
"Entries in public or other official books
or records made in the performance of his
duty by a publi~ officer of this State, or by
any other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by the law, .are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein."
Since there is no statutory requirement that
the Board itself either keep the minutes or approve
the minutes, and since the clerk is required by law
to keep an accurate journal of the proceedings, his
notes and records must of necessity be considered
official documents. Courts of common law have for
many centuries re~ognized th.at entries made in the
course of official business by public officers are
admissible in evidence, despite the hearsay rule.

10
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Section 78-25-4, U~tah Code Annotated 1953,
provides that an entry made by an officer or Board
of officers, or under the direction and in the presence of either, in the course of official duty, is
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in such
entry.
The notes and minutes taken by the clerk during the a~tual conduct of an official meeting of the
Board of Education are "entries made by an officer
in the presence of a board of officers in the course
of official duty."
An entry has been described as committing in
writing, that which is written, whether words or
figures, and has been defined as the act of making
or entering a record or a setting down in writing
of particulars. It has also been described as that
which is entered. The act of setting down or causing
to be set down in writing is the making of an entry.
30 c J s 267-8.
In the case of Bissell vs. Beckwith, 32 Conn .
509, 517, the court stated that "an entry is .a setting
down in writing."
In Thomason vs. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, 11 Pac.
20, the ~Supreme Court of the State of California
had before it for determination the question whether
a certain constitutional amendment had been properly adopted. One of the requirements present in
the Constitution of California required that proposed amendments be ie-ntered in the journals of
both Houses, with the ayes and nays taken thereon.
11
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When the partic·ular amendment was proposed it
was not entered at length, that is, written out in
full in the journal of both Houses. It was written
out in full in the journal of one of the Houses. The
entry was made in the oth·er by identifying reference only. In th·e course of the opinions written by
the Justices in this case, Judge McKee said, "to
'enter' a paper upon a public journal of record is
to inscribe, to enroll, to record it, Webster's Dictionary; 'entering'; 'entry, as a matter of record, is
the act of setting down or causing to be set down in
writing; recording or causing to be recorded, in
due form', Abbott's Law Di~tionary 430, word
'entry' ''.
Certainly, in view of the authorities just quoted,
the act of the School Board clerk, in committing to
writing the activities at a School Board meeting, is
the making of an "entry" in the course of his official
duties. This being the case, such notes .and entries
are "official documents."
Under the Utah Statutes two classes of "entries"
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Included in the first class are entries in public or
other official books or records. (Section 78-25-3
Utah Code Annotated 1953). Included in the second
class are entries made by an officer or board of
officers~ in the presence of either in the course of
official duty. With respect to the second class of
entries, the statute recites no requirement as to the
place of the entry. (Section 78-25-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953). Thus under section 78-25-4, it is immaterial whether the entry is made in an official
12
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book or record, so long as it is made in the presence
of a board of officers in course of official duty.
When these two requirements are met the entry is,
by statute, accorded status as an official document.
Under common law rules official documents are admissable as prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. Thus sections 78-24-3 and 4, supra, .are in
effect, statutory recognition of the fact these two
classes of "entries" are official documents. When
the clerk of the school board attends an official
board meeting and makes notes of the transactions
of said meeting he is, as an officer making ".an entry
* *·* in the presence of" a board of officers, "in the
course of official duty." This follows because the
law makes i~t the duty of the clerk of each school
board to attend all meetings of the board and keep
an accurate journal of its proceedings. T'he taking
of notes during the actual progress of the meeting
is a natural and proper part of the process of "keeping an accurate journal." If for any reason such as
the death of the 1Clerk the journal h.ad not been
made up, but the ·Clerk's trans~ribed notes prepared
in the form for submittal to the Board were available, would any court in Utah deny the admissibility
of such notes? We do not believe so.
The court decisions of Kentucky and Alabama
lend considerable support to ~the argument that
notes taken during official meetings by a clerk are
"official documents". Under the well established
rule in these courts amendments nunc pro tunc to
minutes of political-subdivisions can only be made
when the amendment is supported by some note or
memorandum made concurrently with the holding

13
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of the original meeting. Thus the original notes of
a clerk are accorded official status and acc·epted as
official documents upon which to b.ase a nunc pro
tunc amendment. See Jeffers v. Wharton 197 So. 352,
29 Ala. App. 428; Rickets v. Hiawatha :Oil & Gas Co.,
18~ S.W. 2d 858, 300 Ky. 548 (Ky. 1945); Jefferson
c~ounty v. 'Case 12 :So. 2d 343, 244 Ala. 56 (Ala 1943).
In the case. of the State v. Hunter, 127 W.V.a. 738,
34 S.E· 2d 468, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia in 1945 discussed rather fully the
meaning of "public records". In this case the owner
and publisher of a newspaper brought a mandamus
action to compel the clerk of the court to permit the
examination of the chancery praecipe book insofar
as memorandum written in su~h book relates to
suits for divorc-e. The West Virginia statute provided "the records and papers of every court shall
be open to the inspection of any person, and the
clerk shall, when required, furnish copies th·ereof. * * * *" The court held in this case that the
memorandum book was not a record or paper within
this code provision, pointing out that there was no
statute requiring that such a book be kept. The
keeping of this record was for the convenience of
the clerk and was not required as part of his duties.
In the course of reaching th·ese con~lusions, the
court commented upon public records as follows:

"A public record has been defined as 'a
written memorial made by a public officer
authorized by law to perform that function,
and intended to serve as evidence of something written, said, or done' Bouviers Law
14
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Dictionary, Rawle's Third Revision, Vol. 3,
page 2843. The foregoing definition is quoted
with approval in the case of Coleman vs.
Commonwealth, 25 Grat., Va., 865. The officer
making such record must have authority to
do so, but that authority does no~t necessarily
rest on express legislative enactment. 'Whenever a written record of the transactions of
a public officer, in his office, is a convenient
and appropriate mode of dis~harging the
duties of his office, it is not only his right but
his duty to keep that written memorial,
whether expressly required so to do or not;
and when kept it b·ecomes a public document * * *', Coleman v. 1Commonwealth, supra
*** In order to attain the status of a public
record, the writing must be made by an
officer duly authorized and empowered to
act in the premises, or under the supervision
of such officer."
The duties of the clerk in recording the actual
happenings of the School Board meeting are purely
ministerial and do not involve the exercise of any
discretion whatsoever. The clerk's function is
merely to write or register in proper form the transactions of the body to which he belongs. As a matter
of fact, the definition of the word "clerk" for legal
purposes is substantially as just given: "One who
keeps, or records, or writes, or registers the transactions of th·e body." C. J. Sec·, Vol. 14, PP 1206,
definition of "clerk".
In the case of State ex rei Lovell vs. Tinsley,
____ Mo. ____ (1951), 236 S. W. 2d 24, the court had before
it a mandamus petition to require a clerk of a school
15
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board to corr·ect his minutes so as to reflect the
truth. In a lengthy carefully considered opinion the
court allowed the writ. The following comments
from page 28 were made by the court:
"Obviously, recording and reciting th·e
business transacted at a meeting, and writing
or rewriting the minutes to speak the truth,
does not call on respondents for the ex·ercise
of discretion, but rather involves only the
mechanical, ministerial act of faithfully recording and certifying to the truth con~ern
ing what happened. Truth is established, fixed,
constant, eternal. It is not subject to the
exercise of discretion or construction. It is
not variable. In reporting the truth, the clerk
has no latitude, power of fr·ee decision, or
room to decide at will or according to his
pleasure."
Diligent search has only uncovered one Utah
case which might be helpful on this point. In Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 219,
72 Pac. 2d 467, the court had before it the question
of whether to revoke a driving license because the
driver had been convicted of a certain criminal offense. The T·ax Commission was required by mandatory provision of law to revoke the driving license
upon receipt by it of a "record of conviction." The
only question before the court was whether a "record of conviction" had b·een received. The court
points out tha•t "record" is a word of equivocal
meaning, and the popular meaning of this word was
largely relied upon by the court in its decision. The
important part of the decision, from our standpoint,

16
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was the court's reliance upon the definition of "r~e
cord" given by :Bouvier, as follows: "A written
memorial made by a public officer authorized by
law to perform that function and intended to serve
as evidence of something written, said or done."
Black's Law Dictionary defines "record" as a
"written account of some act, transaction or instrument drawn up under authority of law by a proper
officer, and designed to remain as a memorial or
permanent evidence of the matters to which it relates."
Webster's New International Dictionary defines
"record" as "that which is written or transcribed to
perpetuate knowledge of acts or events; reduction
to writing as evidence; also the writing so made."
Each of these definitions is quoted in the Emmerston case supra, by this court.
Certainly under these definitions the entries
made by the clerk in the course of his official duties
are "records", yes, even publi~ records.
In the case of Morrison vs. White, 10 Cal. App.
2d 261, 52 Pac. 2d 261 (California 1935), it was
contended that a special election was not properly
authorized by the county board of supervisors in
that the minutes authorizing th·e election and fixing the date as of August 28, 1934, was not actually
written into the journal of the board until sometime
after September 1, 1934. The journal purported to
show that on June 11, 1934, a resolution was passed
by which an election was called. It .appeared from
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the testimony of the clerk of the board that rough
minutes of the board were kept by the clerk and that
from these rough minutes the entries in the journal
were thereafter made. The court said:
"The time the entries are actually made
in the journal appears to us to be merely a
clerical detail in~idental to the calling and
holding of the special election, and the transcribing of the minutes thems.elves were purely
clerical and not jurisdictional."
In order for the court to have reached this
conclusion it m·ust have considered the rough notes
made by the clerk at the time of the actual meeting
as original documents and also as official documents. Otherwise the court could not have permitted the transcribing from these rough notes into
the official journal at a subsequ~ent date to have
been proper and merely a clerical ministerial duty.
Any statute in derogation of the common law
right of inspection of public records should be construed strictly. On the contrary, any statute which
allows ~th~e inspection of public records should be
construed liberally in favor of the right of inspection. 76 C. J. Sec. 137.
In further support of his position we cite Sears,
Roebuck and ~Co. vs. Hoyt, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 756. In
this case the New York court stated tha't the provisions of general municipal law, providing that
certain records are public records and open to inspection, should be liberally construed for the protection of taxpayers.

18
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The basic reason behind the common law rule
and the statutory provisions allowing the general
public to have access to all public wri•tings is that
the public at large are entitle_d to know what goes
on in official bodies during th·eir deliberations. The
purpose of requiring by statute that journals shall
be kept is to provide a means whereby the public
can verify the actions and can at all times know what
has officially transpired in the meetings of public
bodies. Since resondents have by their pleadings admitted that the actions taken at school board meetings are efficacious and controlling, and since
respondents have further admitted that the clerk
of the school board did take notes at the meeting,
and that the clerk has transcribed his tentative notes,
certainly appellants are entitled to see these transcribed notes, without having to await the approval
of these notes by the Board. The duty of the clerk is
ministerial, and appellants assume that he has honestly and correctly recorded the actual decisions and
actions taken at the school board meeting. This being so, appellants are entitled to see these notes
without awaiting any approval by the board.
Under the laws of the State of Utah, school
boards, being creatures of statute, have no powers
beyond their statutory grant. This rule was announc·ed in the case of Bertognoli vs. Baker, ____ Utah
____ , 215 Pac. 2d 626. Being creatures of law, and having only those specific powers granted them by the
law, school boards cannot assume powers unto themselves not specifically given by statute. Nowhere in
the laws of the State of Utah is it provided that the

19
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journal kept by the. clerk pursuant to the mandate
of law must be approved by the school board before
it shall be considered "the journal of the clerk." On
th·e other hand, appellants do not deny the right
of the school board to insist upon corrections at any
time that the journal of the clerk contains errors.
This, however, does not mean that the journal is
not an official document until approved by the
board. O·n the contrary, appellants recognize that
any public body such as a school board has the inherent power to require amendment of minutes of
its proceedings to reflect the truth.
The high court of ;Conn·ecti~ut in a very old
case went about as far as any court has ever gone
in considering this very matter. In the case of Samis
vs. King, 40 ~Conn. 298 (1873) the court had before it
a case wherein the following facts w·ere at issue. We
quote. from this decision:
"T·he charter in its twentieth section provides that the city clerk shall be clerk of the
common council and shall make and keep true
records of all the votes and proceedings of the
common council, and also provides that such
records shall be in all courts evidence of the
truth of the matters therein r·ecorded. And
the clerk is required to be sworn to the faithful performance of his duties.
"If he should happen to make a mistake
in his record h·e may be corrected if erroneous
by mandamus, but the record, until amended
by him (court's underscoring) or by order of
court on mandamus, is the proper evidence of
what took place at the meeting of May 26th,

20
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and was properly so regarded by the Superior
Court.''
The question in the ~samis case just quoted was
whether the official record of this meeting certified
to by the clerk was evidence of what took place or
whether the record as attempted to be amended at
a subsequent meeting of the council was to be treated
as the true record.
In 32 C. J. Sec., at 478, the following statement
is made:
"When a formal record * * * has not yet
been made up, those entries, su~h as the files
and the entries in the minute books which are
permitted to stand in the place of it, are admissible in evidence as the record."
Substantially the same do~trine is set forth in
45 Am·erican Jurisprud·ence at page 421, wherein the
following statement is made:
"The public character of records is not
ordinarily to be determined by the manner in
which they are kept or by any formal characteristics. The fact that the information containe.d in original public documents has been
or may be found in books wherein it has been
classified and arranged for more convenient
access does not deprive such public documents
of their character. Thus, a stub receipt book in
a city treasurer's office which contains the
record of cancelled certificates of tax sales,
the list of lots redeemed from sales for special
city taxes, and also the list of lots sold to the
city for delinquent taxes and afterward as21
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signed to individuals are public records within
the meaning of a statute which provides for
inspe-ction of such records, notwithstanding
that all data contained in such books are, at
the convenience of the treasurer, to be entered
in re.cord books which are accessible to the
public. Likewise, where a public officer has
prepared a report based on questionnaires
filed in his office, the questionnaires do not
thereby lose. their character as public documents."
Certainly the notes and entries of the clerk of
the School Board would be admissible in evidence
as the record at any time. prior to the preparation
by the clerk of the formal "journal". If for any
reason such as death of the clerk, the journal had
not been made up, the transcribed notes of the cle-rk
taken during the course of .an official meeting would
be admissible under the provisions of Section 78-25-4,
Utah Code Annotated 1953.
During the argument of this case in th·e lower
court a great deal of emphasis was made by counsel
for the respondents on the "busy-body" nature of
appellants activities in this case. Appellants do not
apologize for their activities, but on the contrary
are very proud of their interest in the actions of
their school board. As taxpayers and parents of
school children they are vitally interested in all
actions .and decisions of their school board. A school
building program is currently one of the problems
of the Nebo School Board. Appellant's request to see
the school board minutes just as soon as the clerk
had transcribed his notes was not just to satisfy

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

an idle curiosity, but was a ligitimate effort to
follow accurately and promptly the activities of
their board. This so-called "busy-body" activity on
their part was met by the amazing attitude of the
Board that its actions and decisions, even tho record·ed by its own clerk, were to be denied to the
public until some indefinite time in the future when
the Board might see fit to put its stamp of approval
on the clerk's record of the proceedings. The duty
of the clerk to keep an accurate journal is purely
ministerial and does not involve the ·exercise of any
discretion whatsoever. In fact, the clerk's function
is merely to register the transa~tions of the body
to which he belongs. This simply requires that he
record the truth, which is eternal. Both counsel in
the argument belov1 and the lower court in its
opinion, labor over the contemplated inaccuracies
of a journal in which direct entries might be made
by a clerk without first submitting the entire proposal to the Board for its clearance. The lower court
asks who could know best what was proposed and
who proposed it, seconded it and how the vote went.
The court answers the inquiry by asserting that the
ones who proposed, seconded and voted upon a matter would be most apt •to know accurately what had
transpired. Experience with deliberative bodies has
long since shown the contrary to be true. A clerk
who is not emotionally involved in a heated controversy but who merely sits on the sidelines and
acts as a reporter noting down the transactions
as they occur is bound to be more accurate than the
faulty memory of individuals considering the detailed matters a month later. Our wise legislative
23
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mandate. that the clerk "shall attend all meetings
of the board, shall keep an accurate journal of its
proceedings," places this responsibility on the clerk,
not ~the board.
Who is the administrative officer of the school
board? Suppose the. Board at a proper meeting
authorizes and directs the clerk to place an order
for the purchase of miscellaneous school supplies.
Both counsel for respondents and the lowe-r court
concede that the clerk could properly proceed to
consummate the purchases. But, they say that the
same. clerk can't be trusted to accurately record the
above Board proceedings until the Board at a later
meeting has approved the tentative notes for accuracy. Thus the clerk can act in behalf of the Board
as its administrative officer and carry out to complete fulfillment decisions of the Board, but he
can't put these same decisions in a record so the
public might know about Board actions beforehand
or at least concurrently.
The pleadings and stipulations in this case show
conclusively that "the clerk had assembled his notes
apparently made concurrently with the meeting and
had transcribed then1 into a tentative copy for submission to the. Board for rejection, amendment or
approval as the Board might direct," (memorandum
decision of Lower Court R-45) before the appellants
requested the opportunity to see the minutes. Thus,
the-re is absolutely no question about the fact that
the clerk had completed his ministerial duties by
having record·ed the transactions of the Board meet-
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ing, except for the mechanical job of either placing
or copying these notes into the journal.
The clerk did not say in this case that he was
still considering what should be entered as the minutes of the meeting. He had assembled his notes
and transcribed them into the form which he must
have considered accurately reported the Board's
proceedings. He was satisfied that he had to the
best of his ability done his statutory duty. Yet
respondents contend that the public is still to be
denied the opportunity to see these notes until some
vag11e time in the future when the Board might
meet and approve the notes for entry in the journal.
Appellants contend that the official "Joumal"
of the Board meetings is not the only public writing
connected with school board operations that appellants are entitled to inspect. In fact appellants readily concede that the transcribed notes they asked to
see on Feb. 19, were not at that time in such form
and location as to constitute th·em as the "journal."
This is not the issue of this case. The real issue is
whether the entries made by the clerk in the course
of his official duty, i·e., the making of notes during
~the meeting, the assemblage of those notes and the
transcribing of them into a copy ready for submission to the Board, constitute an official docu,ment (Sec. 78-26-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953).
The lower court erroneously states the issue as
follows: "Are notes, or memoranda, of the proceedings of the school board, taken by the clerk for his
own convenienc-e in entering the 'accurate' record
25
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into the 'journal', 'other official documents', so .as to
bring them within subsection (3), 78-26-1 above and
subje.cting them to inspection by any citizen as set
forth in Sec. 78-26-2 above?" (R-38) This statement
of the issue completely overlooks the fa~t that at
the time plaintiffs requested the opportunity to inspect th·e minutes, the clerk had "transcribed his
tentative notes so as to present them to the Board
at the next succeeding meeting of the Board for approval as official minutes." (Defendants answer
paragraph 5 R-15). The clerk at the time of the
request by appellants, had already, (1) attended
the meeting in qu·estion, (2) made notes during such
meeting, (3) transcribed these notes, (4) and put
them into the form for actual submittal to the Board
for its approval. Thus it cannot be .argued as the
lower court does in its memorandum decision that
appellants were requesting the right to inspect
"hasty memoranda made by the clerk under pressure
of the business of a session of the Board and burdened with error which reason and common knowledge would expect to exist." (page 6 memo decision
R-39).
The memorandum decision of the lower court
fails completely to note or discuss the fact that the
statute imposes the duty of keeping the journal on
the clerk of the Board, not the Board itself. In fact
under the decision of the lower court, the Board
must approve the contents of the journal entries
before the clerk can make up the journal. To better
illustrate the error of the court in this respe~t, let's
asS'ume a hypothetical situation, as follows:
26
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Assume the Board at a duly called meeting
passes a resolution to raise the salary of a certain
teacher effective two months later. Assum·e further
that the Board instructs the clerk not to show the
resolution in its minutes or journal for that meeting. Now assume that the clerk insists upon recording the resolution in the journal. Obviously under
Section 53-6-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the
clerk should and would prevail if he insisted on his
right to keep the journal accurate by including the
resolution. This extreme example illustrates very
forcefully the importance of the legislative mandate
that the clerk keep the journal. The lower Court
ruling has amended the statute by providing that
the Board shall determine the contents of the journal
before the clerk can make entries therein.
The right of the Board to order a correction of
previous minutes is an independent power common
to any similar public body. The right to corr·ect error
existing in previous minutes does not alter the statutory mandate that the clerk shall keep the journal.
It should be noted, however, that the proper parliamentary manner to correct a journal is to show the
corre~tion in the subsequ·ent entry, not to go back
and erase or rewrite the original journal entry·
The importance of the issue before this court
can not be minimized or overlooked. We live in a
democracy where all powers of government are deriv·ed from the consent of the governed.
Knowledge of what, when and how a governmental agency is proposing to act is absolutely es27
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sential to the body politic. This knowledge to be of
any real value must be timely and completely current. Taxpayers and citizens, such as appellants, are
not mere students interested in the history of what
transpired a month pr·eviously. They are the source
of all the powers and authority vested in respondents, and are justly entitled to know promptly and
on a current basis exactly what respondents have
done, what they ar·e doing and what they contemplate doing in the future. Furthermore, they are
entitled to gather these facts from the official source,
the transcribed notes or minutes of the clerk of the
School Board, and not be required as suggested by
the pleadings of respondents and the findings of the
trial court to gather the information second handed
from neighbors who might have attended the meetings of the Board.
Appellants are utterly unable to understand
why respondents feel it is proper for respondents to
keep th·e minutes of their meetings secret from the
public until after the minutes have been read and
approved at subsequent meeting. Accuracy of the
journal is not and cannot be accepted as a valid
justification for withholding knowledge from the
public. In the first place respondents have admitted
that actions have been taken and obligations have
been incurred by the Board without awaiting approval of their minutes. As previously indicated in
this brief, the clerk of the school board being the
administrative officer of the board must have on
innumerable occasions carried out mandates of the
Board long prior to approval of the journal covering
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such mandates. This court can take judicial knowledge of this in view of respondents admission that
actions are taken without awaiting approval of the
minutes. If the clerk can be trusted to carry out
mandates and decisions surely he should be trusted
to report the decisions accurately. The statutes impose the duty of keeping the journal on the clerk
anyway, and not on the board.
However, let us for the moment assume the
existence of a careless, inaccurate clerk. Assume
that he is inaccurate in two respects:
1. He reports the Board actions in error;
2. He misunderstands the Board's decisions and
personally takes erroneous action.
Now, assume that the erroneous report (Board
Journal) is promptly published. It is almost a certainty that by virtue of releasing the erroneous
minutes that the error of action will be disclosed
immediately and corrected. Why? Because citizens
and taxpayers, such as app·ellants, having current
and timely knowledge of the clerk's actions could be
counted upon to discuss the clerk's actions with
Board members.
Even if the foregoing assumptions and argum·ent are totally invalid, we submit that it is far
more vital that the public be given prompt and
current access to Board minutes, than it is to delay
public access for a month just to try to insure more
accuracy in the journal. After all, if the clerk makes
·erroneous journal entries, they can be corrected at
29
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the next meeting. However, erroneous actions in
many instances might be irrevocable. If by releasing
the minutes as soon as th~e clerk transcribes them, an
erroneous action could be ave-rted, that would be far
more important than to safeguard personal embarrassment because of errors by withholding the
minutes just to have one more chance. at accuracy.

~coNCLUSION

Appellants assert in their complaint (R. 13)
that respondents are legally obligated to make the
minutes of their meetings immediately available for
inspection and copying by having said minutes
promptly transcribed and available for inspection.
On th~e basis of the pleadings and record in this
case there can be no dispute that the clerk had transcribed his notes at the time appellants requested
the opportunity to examine the minutes. Therefore,
.as to the particular request involved, a determination that the transcribed notes are public writings
would require a reve-rsal of the low~er court's decision
on this point.
However, appellants are seeking further relief,
as noted in paragraph two of their prayer (R. 13).
This court is requested to declare the law of the
:State of Utah with respect to respondent's obligation promptly to transcribe the minutes of their
meetings. The obligations to transcribe the notes
or minutes currently and promptly is independent
of the obligation to permit inspection and copying
30
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of the minutes, although the two are necessarily
related.
Appellants sincerely request this court, pursuant to 78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to
establish and declare the law of Utah on this important public question.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON and MANGUM,
by Max K. Mangum,
Attorneys for Appellants
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